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Abstract
Many comparative scholars classify personalist regimes as a distinct category of non-
democratic rule. To measure the process of regime personalisation, and to distinguish
such a process from overall authoritarian reversal, is difficult in comparative context.
Using the Russian political regime in 1999–2014 as a case study, we examine the dy-
namics of regime personalisation over time. Relying on original data on patron-client
networks and expert surveys assessing policy influence of the key members of the rul-
ing coalition, we argue that having more clients, or clients who are more powerful,
increases the power of patrons — and that where the patron is the ruler, the resulting
measure is an indication of the level of personalisation of the regime. We trace regime
personalisation from the changes in political influence of the president’s associates in
his patron-client network versus that of other elite patron-client networks. We find that
as early as 2004, the Russian regime can be regarded as personalist, and is strongly so
from 2006 onwards.
Key Words: personalism, patronage, leadership, authoritarian reversal, Russian poli-
tics.
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Following the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the escalation of conflict in Eastern
Ukraine, a number of Western countries imposed sanctions on Russian officials, entities and desig-
nated “members of the Russian leadership’s inner circle.”1 One of the goals behind sanctions was
presumably to change the calculus of the key members of the elite, who in turn would be able to in-
fluence the Russian president. Informed observers of Russian politics dismissed such calculations,
however, arguing that “nobody will speak out because of the implicit threat of retribution.”2 Like-
wise, one of the sanctioned billionaires, Gennady Timchenko, categorically ruled out the notion
that sanctioned businessmen would even think of influencing the president.3
The logic behind sanctions is seemingly based on the assumption that in 2014, Russia resem-
bles the type of political regime commonly referred to as personalist (Geddes, 1999). Indeed,
personalist regimes can be sensitive to loss of revenue due to the need to fund patronage (Escriba-
Folch and Wright, 2010). Both officials and observers of Russian politics point out that Vladimir
Putin appears to be able to make most important decisions, such as accession of Crimea, by him-
self.4 The lack of autonomous institutions that can constrain or replace the ruler, and the fact that
1See U.S. Department of the Treasury, 20 March 2014, “Treasury Sanctions Russian Of-
ficials, Members Of The Russian Leadership’s Inner Circle” at http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl23331.aspx.
2Bloomberg, 21 July 2014, “Russian Billionaires in ‘Horror’ as Putin Risks Isolation”, available
at http://www.bloomberg.com/archive/news/2014-07-21/.
3ITAR-TASS, 4 August 2014, “Timchenko: Everything Has to Be Paid for, and Acquaintance
with Top Officials as Well.”http://itar-tass.com/opinions/top-officials/1353227.
4See The Times, 2 May 2014, “Nostalgia Trip — Putin Taps Soviet Mood to Tighten Rule”
(Ben Hoyle and Lettice Crawley), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/
article4078880.ece.
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the president plays the role of the ultimate arbiter and moderator for competing elite groups and
factions (Hale, 2011), testify that Russia resembles the personalist regime category. Indeed, the
characteristics that many personalist regimes share, i.e., an absence of autonomous institutions or
of elite coalitions autonomous from the ruler (Geddes, 1999; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982) and the
ruler’s permanent — de facto permanent following the 2008 constitutional amendment — tenure
(Baturo, 2014; Brooker, 2000; Svolik, 2012) are clearly present in contemporary Russia. It is not
entirely clear, however, at what stage in the 1999–2014 period the regime became personalist, if
it did. Indeed, the existing scholarship acknowledges that it is difficult to observe the process of
regime personalisation, or personal power acquisition (e.g., Brooker, 2000; Svolik, 2012).
Building on the literature on personalism and patronage, we propose a novel indicator to assess
the degree of personalism using Russia as a case study. We begin by discussing the difficulties of
operationalising regime personalisation — the process under which the ruler acquires more power
over institutions and dominates other political actors. Admittedly, such a process is opaque and
can be conflated with that of authoritarian reversal. Specifically, we propose to measure person-
alisation by gauging the degree of President Putins perceived policy influence as well as all the
key members of his ruling coalition, over time, using two empirical indicators: expert surveys of
individual political influence and patronage data. We estimate changes in policy influence that
can be attributed to Putin’s associates in his patron-client network versus other political elite net-
works. We also provide robustness studies based on three alternative sources of patronage data.
Our findings suggest that the degree of personalism varies over time and that the analysis of polit-
ical appointments in the ruler’s patron-client network provides a tool to gauge personalisation and
the onset of personalism.
Based on patronage and individual policy influence data, we find that the Russian regime can
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be defined as personalist as early as 2004, and becomes strongly personalist over the 2004–8 pe-
riod. Regardless of pinpointing exact transition times, we demonstrate how the usage of data on
patronage relationships and levels of influence of individual members of the winning coalition pro-
vides insights into the dynamics of regime personalisation over time. The paper contributes to the
existing studies of personalist regimes (e.g., Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2010; Frantz and Kendall-
Taylor, 2014; Svolik, 2012), of patronage networks in Russian politics (Ledeneva, 2013; Petrov,
2012; Sakwa, 2011) and provides observable indicators for the development of the “patronal” pres-
idency in Russia (e.g., Hale, 2005, 2011).
Personalism, Authoritarian Reversal, and Regime Personalisation in Russia
Existing comparative politics research offers various typologies of non-democratic regimes that
distinguish personalist regimes from other regime types such as military and party regimes (e.g.,
Escriba-Folch and Wright, forthcoming; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014; Geddes, 1999; Wright,
2008). Typically, scholars use personalist regimes as a baseline category to compare the effects
of institutions and institutionalisation across different regime types. As rightly pointed out by
Hadenius and Teorell (2007), however, a degree of personalism can be present in different regime
types, including military and party regimes. Furthermore, Svolik (2012) argues that existing ty-
pologies ignore the multidimensionality of authoritarian politics: the degree of personal authority
of the ruler can vary significantly across regime types and over time, varying from contested non-
democracy, based on power-sharing, to established autocracy where the ruler rules supreme.
Not only do we lack empirical indicators for the onset of personalism and its dynamics over
time, in cases where the executive takeover occurs in a partly or fully democratic regime, one must
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also distinguish personalisation from overall authoritarian reversal. Indeed, a path to personal
dictatorship can occur not only in non-democracy but also via an autogolpe launched by an elected
democratic president “to misappropriate the public office and powers he acquired by democratic,
constitutional means” (Brooker, 2000, 129).
The case of Russia from 1999–2014 illustrates the difficulties of measuring and separating
authoritarian reversal and regime personalisation. Consider the question of authoritarian reversal
first. The majority of democracy and governance indices regard Russia in 1999 as partly demo-
cratic. There exists a disagreement, however, regarding its regime type following 1999. Thus,
Polity (Marshall and Jaggers, 2011) upgrades Russia from partly democratic at +3 in 1999 to
democracy at +6 in 2000, mainly due to its very arguable improvement in executive constraints;
in 2007 it downgrades Russia to +4. Another index offered by Freedom House treats Russia as
partly democratic until 2004, when it becomes unfree.5 Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010)
treat Russia as a dictatorship throughout the period 1991–2008, and — since Russia is not de-
fined as democratic — include neither 1993 paraconstitutional changes nor a more recent 2008
manipulation of term limits as instances of “consolidation of incumbency advantage.” However,
Gandhi (2008), who closely follows this categorisation, does not classify Putin’s regime as a dicta-
torship. Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) treat Russia’s regime as personal autocracy ever since
Yeltsin’s takeover of 1993, while Svolik (2012) defines it as authoritarian from 2005, even though
arguably the ruling coalition that formed in the 1990s continued into the 2000s (e.g., Shevtsova,
2007, 36–40).
5In contrast, Polity as late as 2010, argued that “there is no reason to think that Putin will seek
to eliminate Russia’s fragile democratic institutions in the near future.” See the Russia report at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/p4creports.html.
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Clearly, the available measurement tools reflect an increased executive control and curtailment
of political freedoms and civil liberties over time (see Trofimov, 2012). The establishment of exec-
utive control over the judiciary, legislature, and regions is well documented (Gel’man, Ryzhenkov
and Brie, 2003; Goode, 2007; Sakwa, 2011). Even though there had never been anything as drastic
as a constitutional referendum, a dismissal of parliament, or enabling laws, there had been a grad-
ual acquisition of more and more executive authority from early in 2000 — admittedly, partly by
more consistently leveraging the presidential powers enshrined in the 1993 constitution that were
not fully utilised by Yeltsin (Levitsky and Way, 2010, 82) — so that sometime in 2004 the presi-
dent has indisputable authority over the executive, legislative, judiciary, and enforcement branches
at federal and regional levels.
These assessments of an authoritarian reversal in Russia, while important, cannot fully illu-
minate the regime’s journey toward personalism. If we rely on indicators that treat Russia as a
non-democracy throughout 1999–2014, we simply ignore various developments that led the coun-
try from a relatively competitive regime in 1999 (Levitsky and Way, 2010) to a more authoritarian
one in 2014. More importantly, regime indicators tell very little about personalism and regime per-
sonalisation over time. Measures of democracy simply reflect a reversal in democratic freedoms,
not necessarily the strengthening of personal control over the regime by the incumbent leader: an
authoritarian reversal can be driven by a collective endeavour of elite groups that might be aiming
at establishing a hegemonic party regime rather than a personalist regime. Indeed, the actions of
the federal executive in Russia to acquire control over the legislature and party system (Remington
and Reuter, 2009; Hale, 2006; Trofimov, 2012) could have benefited not only the ruler and his in-
ner circle but also a broader segment of political elite which, unhindered by the opposition, could
have enjoyed longer tenures in office with its associated rent-seeking opportunities. In 2004–11
6
the regime also exhibited certain features of a hegemonic party regime type (e.g., Remington and
Reuter, 2009), albeit the role of the ruling party seemingly diminished after Putin’s return to the
presidency in 2012.
What are the observable indicators of regime personalisation and when did Vladimir Putin
make his regime personalist, if he did so? The comparative literature on personalism acknowledges
that the process of personalisation is opaque and difficult to observe (Svolik, 2012, 61). Still, there
exist important characteristics of personalist regimes that scholars often employ in their typologies:
the absence of autonomous institutions and the ruler’s permanent tenure.
If the lack of autonomous institutions or elite coalitions whose agreement is required for ma-
jor policy-making is a characteristic of personalist regimes (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982), Russia
resembles personal rulership. Consider the extent of executive control over the legislature in the
spring of 2014 when the Russian upper chamber swiftly and unanimously approved the president’s
request to deploy troops in Ukraine. None of the legislators present even thought of debating the
bill. It took them less than an hour to vote unanimously on a bill that could potentially have led
the country into war.6 The control over the legislative branch and other branches of government,
as well as the president’s decision to annex Crimea without any visible disagreement among his
6The daily transcript indicates that the registration began at 18:32 and the vote on the resolution
occurred at 19:22. The senators had no questions, neither to the deputy foreign minister who
spoke on the president’s behalf, nor to the deputy defence minister. Instead, fifteen senators all in
turn spoke in favour of the resolution until one of them, Anatolii Lyskov, decided that they were
“wasting [the] President’s time” and that “they understood it all.” See 1 March 2014 transcript at
http://council.gov.ru/activity/meetings/, accessed 1 August 2014.
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coalition members or, seemingly, even their prior knowledge of such plans,7 therefore testify to the
increasingly personalised nature of Russia’s political regime. Przeworski et al. (2000, 21) refers
to the consolidation of incumbency advantage as the moment when “the incumbents unconstitu-
tionally closed the legislature and rewrote the electoral rules to their advantage,” often including
instances of transitions to dictatorship by incumbents, autogolpes. Throughout 1999–2014, the
Russian legislature was never closed, however, and while in 2014 the legislature clearly lacks au-
tonomy and no significant elite coalitions are able to challenge the ruler, in the absence of a metric
for regime personalisation one cannot assign a particular date for the onset of personalism.
The second proposed indicator for personalisation is the moment when the ruler’s power be-
comes permanent — an important stage in the genesis of a personalist regime (Brooker, 2000, 131).
Indeed, while acquiring control over institutions can be driven by the combined interests of the rul-
ing elite, meddling with term limits primarily is driven by the ruler’s personal desire for political
immortality. Indeed, Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) who operationalise consolidation of
incumbency advantage similar to Przeworski et al. (2000, 21), include not only the moment the
incumbent shuts down the legislature but also when, “for whatever reasons, incumbent’s term was
extended.” Presidential tenure prolongation can signify that regime institutions are less important
than the seemingly indispensable person at the helm whose succession threatens to unravel the po-
litical regime (Baturo 2014, 12; Svolik 2012, 198). In Russia, barred from a third consecutive term
in 2008, Putin engineered an election to the presidency of his loyal lieutenant, Dmitry Medvedev,
and remained the de facto leader of the country, albeit as prime-minister. In the UR congress on
24 September, 2011 however, Putin announced his return for a new, now six-year term, also re-
7The Times, 2 May 2014, “Nostalgia Trip,” op. cit.
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newable, that rendered his power in effect permanent. Therefore, the observable manifestation of
personalism in Russia is the meddling with presidential term limits in 2008, as well as President
Putin’s ability to exercise power from a nominally subordinate position from 2008–12.
The comparative literature therefore underlines that the lack of autonomous institutions and
rival elite coalitions, as well as the ruler’s acquisition of permanent power, are important yardsticks
against which to measure personalism. Yet another possibility — related to that proposed below
— is to examine the accumulation of formal powers over hiring and firing — as the ruler gains the
authority to appoint more and more officials, his personal power base grows.8
Patronage Networks and the “Patronal” Presidency in Russia
It is extremely difficult, though not impossible, to measure the ruler’s degree of influence over
relevant institutions in political regimes, or to determine the moment of regime takeover by the
incumbent leader. The indicators discussed above provide information about key turning points in
the personalisation of the regime, but do little to capture the more gradual changes in the degree
thereof between those moments. We propose, however, that one can measure the degree of person-
alisation — whether the ruler established personal authority — more generally, and more directly,
8In 2000, the president acquired powers to dismiss regional governors if they have violated
federal law; they also lose their membership of the Federation Council. In 2004, the president
abolished direct elections of governors so that even though candidates proposed by the president
were to be formally approved by regional legislatures, the president could de facto appoint them.
In 2001, the president acquired authority over the firing and hiring of regional heads of police,
while from 2006 even more police officials were to be subject to presidential appointment. These
changes testify to the increased ability to appoint loyal candidates to the key posts and, therefore,
a stronger power base.
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by investigating his patron-client network and its influence on national policy.
Scholars agree that personalist regimes are mainly built on extensive patronage networks (e.g.,
Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2010). Indeed, personalisation of
power seems to occur as a gradual replacement of key posts by loyal clients, whether this is
Stalin’s Russia or Hussein’s Iraq (Svolik, 2012, 60). Likewise, the acquisition of control by Chile’s
Pinochet over military appointments and retirements was crucial in cementing his personal position
(Brooker, 2000, 145). As Linz (2000, 152) argues, in such regimes many officials are “members of
his family, cronies, business associates, and men directly involved in the use of violence to sustain
the regime.” Therefore, having a sufficient number of loyal clients in key political offices is an
important indicator of a ruler’s personal power base and, therefore, regime personalisation.
In the comparative context, rulers vary in terms of the amount of time required to establish
their own, dominant, patron-client network. President Akaev (1990–2005) of Kyrgyzstan came to
nominate northerners, especially those from his clan, to key political and administrative posts only
in 1995, so that with time his network became dominant (Collins, 2006, 244, 248). In contrast,
Karimov of Uzbekistan, appointed in 1989 after the purge of almost all top-ranking local officials
by Moscow, while obliged to share posts between several clan factions, installed his supporters to
key posts quickly and was able to rely on his own network from the start (Collins, 2006, 128).
Russia’s political regime is grounded in patron-client networks — a system called “patronal
presidentialism” (Hale, 2011, 2005) in which the president plays the role of arbiter and modera-
tor for competing groups and factions. Because the Russian constitution envisages a very strong
presidential office, it tends “to generate expectations of future political power that encourage clien-
telistic networks to coordinate their activities around a single dominant political machine led by
the directly elected president” (Hale, 2011, 582). Still, the federal constitution with strong presi-
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dential powers has been in place since 1994, yet from 1996–99 its executive was extremely weak
and contested by other federal and regional political players (Hale, 2006, 211–216). Clearly, un-
like his successor, Yeltsin did not utilise his considerable presidential powers to build a sufficiently
strong patron-client network to personalise the regime, whether because of personal preference
(Levitsky and Way, 2010, 82), or lack of financial resources (Treisman, 2011). The state of un-
certainty before Yeltsin’s departure even caused an elite split between the pro-Kremlin Unity party
and an equally powerful faction around the Fatherland party headed by regional bosses Luzhkov,
Shaymiev and former prime-minister Primakov (Golosov, 2011, 626).
The political regime of Vladimir Putin has not acquired its personalist features overnight. Since
August 1999, Vladimir Putin slowly “set about building his ‘pyramid of power,’ emphasizing sub-
ordination, strengthening the role of the bureaucracy, bringing the members of the security services
into the government, centralizing control, and eradicating opposition” (Shevtsova, 2007, 40). The
influence of his patron-client network developed gradually over time as he placed many of his
associates in key positions during his time in office as prime-minister and president. The author-
itative Russian weekly argued that in the middle of 2000, almost a year since his selection as
prime-minister, the newly elected president controlled only about 15 percent of about 150 of the
key political and administrative officials. Instead, the old Yeltsin network — with the president’s
chief of staff, Voloshin as its de facto coordinator — was still significantly larger (Drankina et al.,
2000). Even though the president was able to appoint his supporters to key posts in enforcement
agencies early on, as late as the beginning of 2003 he was still unable to replace officials in the cab-
inet who represented other interests. In the words of the same weekly that employed the analogy of
shares to explain personal influence, “the president does not have the controlling stake of “Russia”
corporation. There are many stakeholders [. . .]. The president is no longer a minority stakeholder
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as he was in the beginning, he builds up his stake methodically and meticulously, acquiring assets
that he regards as key” (Arkhangel’skaya, 2001).
In the Russian political economy the extraction and redistribution of rents from natural re-
sources plays a core role. Indeed, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that the redistribution of
private rents, often derived from energy exports, is the key tool at the leader’s disposal. Access
to rents through control of economic resources induces a strong norm of loyalty to the incumbent
leader because such rents can be used as private rewards for coalition members (Bueno de Mesquita
et al., 2003, 65–68, 182). In personalist regimes, the ruler’s “collaborators, with his consent, take
appropriate public funds freely, establish profit-oriented monopolies . . . the enterprises of the
ruler contract with the state” and the division between public and private becomes blurred (Linz,
2000, 151–55). This is an essential component for the sustainability of personalist rule, which
relies heavily on rents.
In Russia, the placement of Putin’s associates into positions of influence in the energy sector
has therefore been crucial for strengthening his regime. Given the increase in oil and gas prices
early in his tenure (see Treisman, 2011), President Putin’s acquisition of control over Gazprom —
the largest natural gas company in the world — meant that by May 2001 he and the state had access
to a very large source of revenue independent from so-called oligarchs.9 Following the demise of
Yukos in 2003, Putin was able to control the energy sector through his deputy, Sechin, and other
close associates (Kolesnikov, 2008; Rahr, 2008). Likewise, many businessmen associated with the
9Yevgeny Yasin aptly called Gazprom “the purse of the government and the president.” Kom-
mersant, 19 March 2003, “Gazprom is the government and president’s purse,” at http://www.
kommersant.ru/doc/371826. In June 2000 Medvedev became its board chairman while in May
2001 Putin’s close associate, Miller, becomes Gazprom’s CEO.
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president’s past in St Petersburg built their own personal fortunes.10
Observers of Russian politics point out that at the end of 2003, the influence of the president’s
patron-client network begins to rival that of Yeltsin’s — with Voloshin’s departure in late 2003,
the presidential administration resembles the office of the old mayor of St Petersburg, stacked
with Putin’s close associates from those days (e.g., Arkhangel’skaya, 2003). Likewise, in 2004
the president is able to bring more loyalists into the cabinet. In general, the expert assessments
apparently suggest that the president’s patron-client network becomes strongest only in late 2003
or early 2004, and that its influence continued to increase thereafter.
The exact organisation of various networks and their relative influence is extremely opaque
(e.g., Kryshtanovskaya and White, 2003; Ledeneva, 2013; Petrov, 2012; Sakwa, 2011). In Russia,
in contrast to regimes in Central Asia and the Caucasus, where informal networks are largely
based on ethnic or family ties (Collins, 2006), these networks are largely organised by a shared
professional or educational background. In part, we know that the position in the informal elite
network around the “patronal” president determines one’s personal influence (Baturo and Elkink,
2014). Such informal networks can potentially be organised formally, so that the degree of affinity
with the ruler can determine what formal political posts the individuals obtain. At the same time,
in personalist regimes, the ruler’s friends can be more powerful than officials in important posts.
In order to measure regime personalisation, we intend to assess the perceived political influence
of Putin’s patron-client network versus other networks over time. In the section below, we explain
10In 2010, the Forbes Top 100 Businessmen list features Gennady Timchenko ranked
at 36, Yuri Kovalchuk at 67 and Arkady and Boris Rotenberg at 99/100 — all close
associates of Vladimir Putin from St Petersburg. See http://www.forbes.ru/rating/
100-bogateishih-biznesmenov-rossii/2010.
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the data we rely on for assessments of political influence. Here we briefly explain the data on
patronage. We employ and extend the data on patron-client networks in Russia from 1999–2014
sourced from various bibliographic data as explained in Baturo and Elkink (2014). We improve on
and extend that data with additional data for the 2011–14 period. For each individual included in
the expert assessment of the Russian ruling coalition (see below), we attempt to identify one or two
patrons — those believed to have elevated the client to positions in politics or the highest echelons
of the civil service, or under whose chain of command clients worked earlier for significant periods
of time.11 We assigned patronage data to 70 percent of individuals included. For seven percent
we could not estimate whether such individuals had patrons, while for the remaining 23 percent
we find no significant patrons, and so these have careers largely of their own making. The latter is
particularly common among businessmen, e.g., Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Altogether, there are 360
individuals that comprise the ruling coalition in 1999–2014 as regarded by the expert survey, and
91 different patrons, with Putin and Yeltsin ranked as the strongest and second strongest patron
overall.12 Later in the paper we additionally conduct several sensitivity tests based on alternative
11For example, the former interior minister and Duma speaker, Boris Gryzlov, is believed to have
as his patron the former FSB director, Nikolay Patrushev. These two individuals are high school
classmates from Leningrad and it was Patrushev who elevated Gryzlov to positions of power in
Moscow. In turn, Patrushev is the close associate of his own patron, Vladimir Putin. In the case
of Yeltsin’s patron-client network, individuals reportedly appointed with the assistance of Yeltsin’s
daughter and son-in-law, Dyachenko and Yumashev, are categorised as Yeltsin’s clients also.
12While the data on patron-client relationships was cross-checked against several sources when-
ever possible, it remains a subjective assessment of informal networks. It is also time-invariant,
based on data at the time of the clients entry into the higher echelons of the political regime. See
however Ledeneva (2013, 94–5, 112–4) on the rigidity of such networks and difficulties of exit.
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data for patronage networks.
[Figure 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 1 displays monthly snapshots of the patron-client network data, which can be repre-
sented as a directed network graph with arrows from client to patron. The size of each vertex
represents the influence score as measured through the expert survey, explained below. In each
subplot, we label five patrons with the largest number of clients that month. As can be seen from
Figure 1, from 1999–2000 Putin’s patron-client network is only one among several and is not the
strongest. In line with the discussion above, throughout 2001–2003 its influence grows while that
of Yeltsin diminishes. Only after December 2003 does Putin’s network appear stronger than the
remnants of Yeltsin’s network.
In the December 2007 subplot that displays the patronage structure of the top political elite
at the time when Putin decides to assume the prime-ministerial office and promotes Medvedev
for presidency, Putin is clearly visible as the most centrally located patron in the network — the
individual with the highest in-degree. Arguably, it is precisely this informal power as the head of
the most powerful patron-client network in the country that gave him the ability to depart from
the presidency in 2008 yet retain his personalised control over the regime. Alongside his control
of the cabinet and ruling party, Vladimir Putin’s preeminence was also built on the firm founda-
tion of having clients among the top officials in the cabinet, administration, state companies and
regions, including President Medvedev himself (Sakwa, 2011). Throughout 2009–10 Medvedev
was rather assertive and his Russia Forward! policy paper and annual state-of-the-union addresses
emphasised his differences with Putin, influencing political discourse in the country (Baturo and
Mikhaylov, 2014, 983). Yet, Putin’s informal power base overshadowed that of his successor by an
order of magnitude, as can be seen in the subplot for September 2011. The last snapshot for 2014
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displays a further weakening of Medvedev’s nascent network and the emergence of new networks,
such as that of Volodin, the new deputy head of administration.
Because personalist regimes rest on extensive patronage networks, we can assume that having
more clients, or clients who are more powerful, increases the patrons power — and that where
such patron is the ruler, the resulting indicator is a measurement of the level of personalisation
of the regime. The section below turns to such measurement analysis, visualising the gradual
personalisation of the Russian regime.
Political Influence of Patron-Client Networks and Regime Personalisation
In difficult measurement tasks, scholars often turn to expert surveys to quantify variables (Benoit
and Laver, 2006; Meyer and Booker, 2001). The selection of the most important members of
the Russian ruling coalition and the assessments of their individual political influence are based
on exactly such expert survey, namely the 100 Most Influential (Leading) Politicians of Russia,
conducted by the survey company Vox Populi together with the Nezavisimaya Gazeta daily, which
assigns scores of influence over domestic and foreign politics and policy for the most important
political actors in Russia. The indicator of the perceived individual influence is on the same scale
for all individuals in the panel, includes a large number of individuals over time; the expert survey
has been used in studies of political elite composition and regime deinstitutionalisation in Russia
(Baturo and Elkink, 2014; Kudeyarova, 1995; Kinsbursky, 2003; Kryshtanovskaya, 2002).
We employ surveys from August 1999 to July 2014, the time period covering fifteen years
in office for Vladimir Putin.13 The data represent the uninterrupted monthly series of the Top
13The monthly survey of political influence, 100 Most Influential (Leading) Politicians of Russia
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100 panel of political actors in this period. Altogether, there are 360 unique individuals, 18,063
observations in total. As explained in the robustness section, the Top 100 can be regarded as a
reasonable representation of the ruling coalition in Russia.
We combine the patronage network data as explained above with the key variable at the level
of the network nodes, the individual members of the political elite, namely their perceived level
of influence on Russian policy-making. The combination of patronage linkage data with measures
of personal influence allows us to approximate the power derived from patronage — the more
powerful the client, the more this patronage link contributes to the patron’s power. For all analyses,
both immediate clients and their own clients are included as the group of clients of a patron,
excluding those further down the patronage ladder.
[Figure 2 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2 provides a visualisation of the level of personalisation in Putin’s Russia. It is important
to read the combination of these three plots. Firstly, the top subplot depicts that while early on
there is a significant increase in the average influence score of Putin and his clients compared to
(Vox Populi, 1993) is available for November 1994 to March 2011. As of February 2007, Nezav-
isimaya Gazeta started its own, parallel expert survey that assesses “on a scale between 1 and 10,
the influence of the following Russian politicians in the Presidential Administration, government,
Federal legislature”. It has a very similar design, and is conducted by the Agency of Political and
Economic Communications. Monthly scores and methodology are available from www.ng.ru. In
the analyses we use Vox Populi (1993) data for July 1999–April 2007 and Nezavisimaya Gazeta
for May 2007–June 2014. For all analyses, we standardize the scores by subtracting the monthly
mean and dividing by the monthly standard deviation. Furthermore, since we are interested in both
average levels of influence for specific subgroups and their total sum influence, we add the absolute
minimum value of this standardised score across all months, such that the lowest score is zero.
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all others, over time it decreases. The observed decrease is directly related to the increase in the
proportion of the elite that belongs to Putin’s network: while key members of the network occupy
influential posts, there are also more and more clients of Putin among the lower ranks. Indeed,
secondly, in the bottom subplot, we clearly see that Putin’s clients rapidly join the top echelons
and occupy a gradually increasing proportion of the ruling coalition overall. Thirdly, the middle
plot displays the sum influence score of Putin and his clients: the number of clients in the coalition
increases to a de facto majority, thus significantly increasing the overall level of influence of the
ruler and his clients together, as displayed in the middle plot.
In summary, these patterns jointly — the initial increase and subsequent decrease in the average
level of influence among the ruler’s clients and the gradual increase in the number of such clients in
the political top echelons, but above all the towering influence of the leader’s patron-client network
compared to other members of the winning coalition — describe the overall regime personalisation
over time.
A breakpoint is visible around 2004 when the proportion of the winning coalition belonging to
Putin’s clients reaches the 50 percent mark and their joint influence of domestic and foreign policy
outweighs that of all other members of the winning coalition together. This is the time around
which two important officials left over from the Yeltsin period — Voloshin, chief of staff of the
president, and Kasyanov, Prime Minister — leave the coalition ranks. Arguably, most observers
of Russian politics would agree that this is a time when Putin’s consolidation of power takes place
(e.g., Sakwa, 2011, 9–10). While 2004 is an important moment in the process of regime takeover by
the incumbent, which is confirmed by our numerical measurements of influence through the patron-
client network, the more important implication is the very gradual nature of regime personalisation.
While a significant point is reached at that time — the 50 percent mark in terms of control of the
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Top 100, and the trumping in influence of Putin’s network over all other members of that Top
100 — there is no large jump in any of these measurements but rather a very gradual trend both
before and after 2004. Nevertheless, the fact that our measurement of influence and patronage ties
suggests a breakpoint at the same time that observers of Russian politics would claim was a key
moment in Putin’s rise to power, gives confidence in the validity of our indicator.
[Figure 3 ABOUT HERE]
The fact that the network of Putin’s clients spans the majority of the ruling coalition does not
imply that there are no other strong patrons or that Putin is the only strong one. As described
above, clients as measured in the data can have none, one or two patrons which implies that they
can have split loyalties. We have no method in our data to measure the degree of affinity and at
any point in time to which patron — whenever there are two such patrons — a particular client
is most loyal. The result is that a large proportion of the clients of Putins clients are also clients
of Yeltins clients . For example, while Yuri Chayka owed his justice ministry portfolio in 1999 to
Vladimir Putin, it was a former Prosecutor-General, Skuratov, who made him his first deputy in
1996, rendering Yuri Chayka a client of Skuratov and therefore of Yeltsin’s head of bodyguards’
Korzhakov, and in turn, of Yeltsin (Zapodinskaya and Gul’ko, 2006).
We therefore need to compare Putin’s patron-client network not just to those individuals outside
that network, but also to the existing alternative patron-client networks which will partly overlap
with his network. Figure 3 is based on exactly such analysis, whereby the patron-client network of
Putin is compared with that of Yeltsin, as well as with other significant patrons among the Russian
elite, such as Voloshin and Luzhkov. This plot uses the sum influence of the patron and his clients,
in line with the middle plot in Figure 2. For the purposes of the current analysis, the patrons
included in the plot are assumed to be strong enough to be patrons of their own networks.
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If we sever a patron-client tie between Yeltsin and Putin despite Putin being a designated suc-
cessor and client of Yeltsin and only include these two networks, we obtain the results displayed
in the left plot, Figure 3. Yeltsin, as the outgoing leader, is the most important patron to surpass
with a number of officials whose careers began in the 1990s and who are still in office in 2000s.
The process by which this happened was described above and it aligns with the proposed, more
numerical depiction of events. We see the influence of Putin’s patron-client network taking shape
in the early years, alongside a persistent and considerable influence of Yeltsin’s network. Only
in 2004 does Putin’s network really take over and are Yeltsin’s former loyalists largely out of the
picture.
While the left-hand side plot in Figure 3 clearly visualises the capture of the regime by one
patron from another patron, it does not properly depict the personalisation of the regime which is
not just related to the top position but to the relative dominance of the top leader and his patronage
network over the others. In the right-hand side plot of Figure 3, therefore, a larger number of
patrons are included which we identify as the most important patrons who themselves have signif-
icant influence and lead strong patronage networks. For the purposes of this analysis, the included
patrons are not counted as clients of their original patrons, e.g., Medvedev is not counted as Putin’s
client and his influence — nor that of his immediate clients — is not included in the calculation
of Putin’s patronage-based influence unless such clients are linked to Putin’s network through a
different route in the network. While at the start of his first year in office, Putin and his clients had
an overall influence similar to that of, for example, Luzhkov and his clients, in 2010 their influence
is magnitudes larger than that of the second-ranked patron, Medvedev, who himself appears to be a
loyal client of Putin. Even though Medvedev occupies the most powerful post in the country from
2008–12, the small size of his patronage network renders him unable to threaten Putin’s power
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base.14
[Figure 4 ABOUT HERE]
The analysis of the influence of the patronage network should not be limited to gauging the
overall level of influence of the ruler’s clients and measuring the proportion of the top political
elite formed by this network. We can also assess the extent to which this network has captured
different elite segments and institutions of government. In the exercise of his “authority building”
(Breslauer, 1982), the ruler needs to install supporters and acquire control of major branches of
government, of enforcement agencies, and resources. Figure 4 that illustrates the gradual penetra-
tion of Putin’s patron-client network into the political regime, clearly shows three episodes since
1999. The establishment of Putin’s power takes place in part through influential clients installed
in the administration and cabinet, but most importantly through the members of the security appa-
ratus, the so-called siloviki.15 Vladimir Putin appears to have acquired control over enforcement
agencies early on, stuffing all important positions in police, security services, and related agencies
with his personal loyalists. After the 2004 presidential election, Putin is able to acquire even more
control by securing the cabinet for his supporters. His personal power then relies primarily on
14First deputy chief of administration, Vladislav Surkov, who arguably came to be regarded
as too loyal to Medvedev during the latter’s presidency, was subsequently fired in “an attack on
Medvedev’s circle” — after Medvedev lost his bid for a second term. See The Washington Post,
8 May 2013, “Russian Deputy Prime Minister Vladislav Surkov Resigns Following Putin Repri-
mand.” http://wapo.st/18u1AhR.
15Note that the definition of siloviki we use here requires that the individual is still part of the
security apparatus — former siloviki are not categorised as siloviki. Some of the described dynamic
might therefore be due not to a declining power of the siloviki, but rather the appointment of former
siloviki to cabinet and administration posts.
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being the patron of the majority in the cabinet, administration, and among security officials.
Around 2008, Vladimir Putin, now prime minister, retains control over the regime by keep-
ing his own clients in nearly all significant cabinet and administrative posts. He also significantly
increases his control over the state companies and business sector, with more clients appearing
among the CEOs of the most influential state companies. Figure 4 also displays that the last seg-
ment of the political elite to be dominated by the ruler’s own patron-client network is regional
governors, from around 2010. The observed acquisition of control over regional elites only in
2010 is, however, the result of very few governors remaining in the Top 100 since late 2004. Like-
wise, even though Putin acquired the powers to have governors dismissed or appointed as early as
2004, powerful Shaimiev of Tatarstan, Ilyumzhinov of Kalmykia, Rakhimov of Bashkororstan, or
Luzhkov of Moscow departed only during Medvedev’s presidency (Baturo and Mikhaylov, 2014).
Regime Personalisation in Russia: Discussion
Table 1 summarises the findings. Personalisation being a feature of any political regime, at different
levels, means that a clear turning point of personalisation is difficult to identify. The power grab by
the ruler is a gradual process with the occasional shock or larger step. Even though the president
acquires control over the siloviki early in April 2000, according to our assessment it takes more than
two years for Putin’s personal network to rival in influence that of Yeltsin’s, and only in October
2003 does it clearly surpass it. Then, in March 2004 when Putin acquires complete control over the
cabinet, his personal network also surpasses in total influence all other networks within the ruling
coalition. Clearly, this constitutes an important yardstick in regime personalisation, such that from
this moment the Russian political regime, even though not fully authoritarian, can be regarded as
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personalised. Since March 2004, the power of the ruler’s network has only increased. According
to our estimations, after August 2006 Vladimir Putin becomes preeminent, with his clients, and
clients of clients, clearly dominating the ranks of the ruling coalition.
[Table 1 ABOUT HERE]
In Russia from 1999–2014 we see both the very gradual personalisation of the regime through
to an increase in the proportion of the elite belonging to Putin’s patronage network and the impact
of major events, such as the alternation in office of the president. Putin’s grasp over the more
informal sectors significantly increases during the presidency of Medvedev from 2008–12, albeit
combined with a slight reduction in the power of the siloviki that brought him to power. It is around
this time when some observers argued that, similarly to the Principate of Caesar Augustus, Putin
established the “Principate of Putin,” i.e., that he became dominant political figure irrespective of
the political office he occupied.16
Also, as can be seen in all three subplots in Figure 2, around 2012, when Putin returns to the
presidency and the regime becomes more repressive, regime personalisation, as measured by our
data, slightly declines. One possible interpretation is that by this time, the ruler’s power becomes
sufficiently entrenched so that reliance on the patron-client network becomes less important, espe-
cially since the formal and nominal powers align again with Putin taking on the presidency. Many
informed observers equally detect that the process underway somehow resulted in a significant,
perhaps qualitative, change: “They [members of the ruling coalition] remember that everything
was somewhat different earlier, because every member had a wider scope [for decision-making],
16Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 25 January, 2011. “Itogi Pervogo Desiatiletiya. 1. Principat Putina,” p.
10.
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not every member, but responsible members [had]. Now Putin sort of lifted off over everybody
else and in some sense he took off.” Likewise, regime insiders come to publicly acknowledge the
ruler’s paramount role — in the words of deputy chief of staff, Volodin, “If there’s Putin — there’s
Russia, if there’s no Putin — there’s no Russia.”17
Further Discussion and Sensitivity Analyses
The preceding analyses rely on several assumptions, such as the inclusion of particular individuals
into the Top 100 of the expert survey being a valid approximation of the Russian ruling coalition,
that the proposed measurement of patron-client relationships is valid, and that measuring the ruler’s
personal power through the dominance of his patron-client network is a valid proxy for regime
personalisation. The alignment between the quantitative findings herein and the interpretations
of informed observers of Russian politics provides significant face value validity to our proxy of
regime personalisation. Below we briefly consider the first two assumptions in turn.
The expert survey of political influence has been used extensively by Russian sociologists that
analysed the composition of the political and economic elite (e.g., Kudeyarova, 1995; Kinsbursky,
2003; Kryshtanovskaya, 2002), and its validity has been extensively examined in Baturo and Elkink
(2014). The restriction to one hundred individuals is somewhat arbitrary, however, this number is
arguably a reasonable approximation of the subset of the key policy-makers in Russian politics that
form the ruling, or winning, coalition: a subset of elite of sufficient size that its support “endows
the leadership with political power” over the regime (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, 51). In the
17First quote is from Gleb Pavlovski, Ekho Moskvy, 18 June 2014, http://echo.msk.
ru/programs/personalno/1380746-echo. Volodin is quoted in http://itar-tass.com/
politika/1525655. Accessed 1 December, 2014.
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historical context, the size of such a coalition in Russia varied between a dozen and two dozen —
if one includes only the Politburo — or from under one hundred to just over two hundred — if one
also accounts for the Central Committee of the CPSU, individuals (See Khlevniuk, 1996). Earlier,
we also referred to the authoritative Russian weekly that estimated the number of key political and
administrative officials to be around 150 individuals in the early 2000s (Drankina et al., 2000).
In general, the survey we rely on is a unique source of data on the political influence of key
officeholders and we believe it is reasonable to regard it as a valid representation of the ruling
coalition in Russia; it does include the most important members of the presidential administration,
cabinet and civil service, as well as the key CEOs of state companies and private businessmen.
How valid is the measurement of patron-client networks? Even though we examined the data
validity using several sources whenever possible, it is certainly a subjective assessment. There ex-
ist numerous alternative studies and reports about informal power structures in the Kremlin (e.g.,
Kryshtanovskaya and White, 2003; Ledeneva, 2013; Petrov, 2012; Sakwa, 2011) — they equally
constitute subjective, however informed, assessments of rather opaque relationships. Indeed, how
the informal institutions and networks are maintained, how they can be identified and their effects
studied remains an important research challenge to comparative politics (Helmke and Levitsky,
2006, 25–28). Consider, for instance, Petrov (2012, 497–500) who reviewed three key expert re-
constructions of political networks, that of “Kremlin towers,” “Politburo” and “Planetary” models
(see also Ledeneva, 2013, 56–60). The first, the “towers” model, emphasises inter-clan rivalry
around 2007 and distinguishes between four major and five minor “towers” — elite clan groups,
all under Putin’s patronage. The “Politburo” model distinguishes between members of the inner
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circle, i.e., “members”, and other clients, i.e., “candidates,”18 while the “planetary” model assumes
a dynamic relationship between the “patronal president” at the centre and three circles of planets-
clients that can move closer to and further from the president.
[Figure 5 ABOUT HERE]
As a robustness test, we turn to the data based on “Kremlin towers” and “Politburo” models
using the list of patron-client networks in Ledeneva (2013, 56–60), supplemented using the original
assessments,19 and add this data to that on political influence in the same manner as earlier. As
a third robustness check, we use the list of officials with a confirmed shared background with the
president, published by the Russian newspaper New Times (Al’bats and Ermolin, 2011).
Figure 5 replicates the analyses reported earlier in Figure 2 using three alternative expert as-
sessments of the ruler’s network. The “Towers” and “Politburo” assessments are largely in line
with the earlier results based on our data: Putin’s network overtakes other networks from 2004–
6 (two subplots in the middle), however it surpasses half of the ruling coalition (two subplots
at the bottom) in 2007 (“Towers”) and 2012 — albeit it gets close to the fifty percent mark in
2008 (“Politburo” subplot). The difference with results obtained from our data is due to a smaller
number of clients included in the alternative assessments. Furthermore, the latter data ignores the
18Also see an expert survey reconstruction of such a network, Minchenko Consulting, Big Gov-
ernment of Vladimir Putin and “Politburo 2.0” Report, http://minchenko.ru/analitika/
analitika_27.html, accessed 2 August, 2013.
19The list of major patrons and their clients for the so-called “Towers” models is available at
http://archive.today/ml6Tp, the list of “Politburo” members and candidate members for Au-
gust 2012 is from http://minchenko.ru/analitika/analitika_27.html, accessed 2 August,
2013. We were unable to ascertain the network composition based on the “planetary” model.
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additional dimensionality of networks, i.e., clients of clients, and that some clients can be shared
between several patrons. Finally, while the network’s influence based on New Times data is equally
ascendant, it is very different from our own results as well as those based on two alternative esti-
mations. However, while this data has the lowest level of subjective assessment and relies only on
the observable professional, family, and educational background shared with the president, it only
categorises eight percent of all individuals in the data and ignores other networks and more tacit
patron-client relationships. In other words, the relatively low influence of the ruler’s network is
expected due to the existence of very few observations.
The relationship between patrons and clients can be much more complicated than this analysis
suggests. It is entirely plausible that while the president relies on his patron-client network to
acquire more control over the political regime, his own clients equally use their patron for leverage
and to advance their goals. Indeed, Collins (2006, 273) who analysed patronage in Central Asia,
argued that the president can be “dependent on clan support, and invested clan elites are highly
dependent on his patronage” so that rival elite groups simply trust the ruler more than they do each
other and therefore prefer to keep the latter at the centre of elite politics as long as the ruler delivers.
While we address the possible issue of such symbiotic relationships between patron and clients by
assessing their total influence, and accounting for clients shared between several patrons in some
analyses, all of the potential difficulties of measuring personal influence cannot be eliminated in
the empirical framework since both informal arrangements and the extent of political influence
are difficult to observe and measure. We believe, however, that in general the available expert
assessments of authoritarian reversal in Russia, as well as alternative measurements of patron-
client relationships employed above, vindicate the validity of our methods and findings.
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Conclusions
When does a political regime become a personal rulership? As Huntington (1991, 126) argues, al-
beit in relation to the opposite process, the “gradual, slow, sure” process of liberalisation in Brazil
that started in 1973 and culminated in a direct presidential election in 1989 makes it “virtually
impossible to say at what point Brazil stopped being a dictatorship and became a democracy.”
Similarly, at what stage from 1999–2014 did the Russian political regime cease being partly demo-
cratic to become non-democratic or, more specifically, a personal autocracy? We agree with Juan
Linz that authoritarianism is a government that is “forever” (Linz, 1998, 20–21): when the ruler’s
horizon acquires this status, it signals the onset of personal autocracy where the identity of the ruler
is more important than institutions. By this logic, Russia transitioned to personalism following the
United Russia congress on 24 September 2011 when Vladimir Putin declared that he would stand
for the presidential elections. However, while this event was an important yardstick in political de-
velopment, regime personalisation has occurred over a longer period of time, as evidenced by the
analysis of the influence of the president’s own patron-client network, with the crucial transition in
early 2004 when Putin’s clients overtook Yeltsin’s old network in influence.
While the quantitative data we employ are only a proxy for personalisation, we demonstrate
how using an indicator for individual policy influence among the members of the political elite,
combined with the data on patron-client networks, can provide significant insights into the dynam-
ics of personalisation. The paper highlights the gradual extension of the ruler’s powers, the slow
decline of the old networks, how the leader’s clients gradually capture the political elite segment
by segment, and the way in which competing patronage networks are subdued over time. Our sta-
tistical measure aligns with how informed observers of Russian politics would be likely to describe
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the development of Putin’s regime — and adds new detail on the underlying speed and dynamics
of the personalisation of the regime. While the main conclusion would have to be that the process
is gradual and depends on the capture of different sectors in the regime, a turning point is perhaps
identifiable in 2004 when we see Putin’s patronage network capturing the numerical majority of
the winning coalition and when it outweighs any other patron’s network in terms of influence by
an order of magnitude.
The findings of this paper will be of interest to scholars of comparative politics and personalist
regimes (Chehabi and Linz, 1998; Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2010; Linz, 2000; Svolik, 2012;
Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2010; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014). We confirm with our data
that the onset of personalism is difficult to identify, yet the accumulation of a ruler’s power can
be estimated if we assess the influence of ruler’s patron-clients’ network versus other networks.
Equally, scholars of post-Soviet and Russian politics (e.g., Hale, 2005, 2011; Ledeneva, 2013;
Petrov, 2012; Sakwa, 2011) will find an additional validation for the importance of elite informal
politics and patronage in the maintenance of “patronal presidency” and regime governance.
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Figure 1: Network Plot of Patronage Relationships Over Time
Note: Plots for selected time periods. Arrows point from client to patron. The size of each vertex represents the
influence score as measured through the expert survey, explained in text. Five patrons with the most clients each
month are labelled.
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Figure 2: Influence of Putin’s Patron-Client Network over Time
Note: The top plot represents the average score for Putin and his clients, as well as his clients’ clients (in black), and
for all those not belonging to this group (in grey). The middle plot represents the total score for Putin and his clients, as
well as his clients’ clients (in black), and for all those not belonging to this group (in grey). The bottom plot represents
the proportion of individuals in the data — members of the Top 100 — who are included in this client network of
Putin.
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Figure 4: Influence of Ruler’s Patron-Client Network in Institutions
Note: The plot represents the sum of standardised influence scores for Putin’s clients and his clients’ clients, includ-
ing the influence score of Putin himself, by different elite segments and institutions, as a proportion of the sum of
standardised influence scores in the segment or institution.
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Regime Personalisation Date Detail
Over 50% of siloviki in Top 100 April 2000 Figure 4
Over 50% of administration in Top 100 September 2001 Figure 4
Equals Yeltsin’s network in influence December 2001 Figure 3 (left)
Surpasses Yeltsin’s network in influence October 2003 Figure 3 (left)
Over 50% of cabinet in Top 100 March 2004 Figure 4
Surpasses all other networks in influence March 2004 Figure 2 (middle)
Over 50% of all in Top 100 August 2006 Figure 2 (bottom)
Over 50% of state companies in Top 100 October 2007 Figure 4
Over 70% of all in Top 100 December 2007 Figure 2 (bottom)
Over 50% of regional elites in Top 100 August 2010 Figure 4
Table 1: The Timeline of Regime Personalisation in Russia
39
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
1.41.61.82.02.22.4
To
w
er
s
D
at
e
Score
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20406080100
D
at
e
Score
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
0.00.20.40.60.81.0
Proportion
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
1.52.02.53.0
Po
lit
bu
ro
D
at
e
Score
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20406080
D
at
e
Score
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
0.00.20.40.60.81.0
Proportion
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
1.52.02.53.0
N
ew
 T
im
es
D
at
e
Score
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
020406080100120
D
at
e
Score
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
0.00.20.40.60.81.0
Proportion
Fi
gu
re
5:
In
flu
en
ce
of
P
ut
in
’s
Pa
tr
on
-C
lie
nt
N
et
w
or
k:
R
ob
us
tn
es
s
Te
st
s
N
ot
e:
T
he
fig
ur
e
pl
ot
s
th
e
in
flu
en
ce
of
pr
es
id
en
t’s
pa
tr
on
-c
lie
nt
ne
tw
or
k
us
in
g
th
re
e
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
so
ur
ce
s
fo
r
pa
tr
on
ag
e
da
ta
:
“T
ow
er
s”
(l
ef
t)
,“
Po
lit
bu
ro
”
(m
id
dl
e)
,
“N
ew
Ti
m
es
”
(r
ig
ht
).
T
hr
ee
su
bp
lo
ts
in
ea
ch
ea
ch
pl
ot
ar
e
co
ns
tr
uc
te
d
in
th
e
sa
m
e
m
an
ne
ra
s
in
Fi
gu
re
2:
th
e
to
p
pl
ot
is
th
e
av
er
ag
e
sc
or
e
fo
rP
ut
in
an
d
hi
s
cl
ie
nt
s,
as
w
el
la
s
hi
s
cl
ie
nt
s’
cl
ie
nt
s
(i
n
bl
ac
k)
,a
nd
fo
r
al
lt
ho
se
no
tb
el
on
gi
ng
to
th
is
gr
ou
p
(i
n
gr
ey
).
T
he
m
id
dl
e
pl
ot
—
th
e
to
ta
ls
co
re
fo
r
Pu
tin
an
d
hi
s
cl
ie
nt
s,
as
w
el
l
as
hi
s
cl
ie
nt
s’
cl
ie
nt
s
(i
n
bl
ac
k)
,a
nd
fo
ra
ll
th
os
e
no
tb
el
on
gi
ng
to
th
is
gr
ou
p
(i
n
gr
ey
).
T
he
bo
tto
m
pl
ot
—
th
e
pr
op
or
tio
n
of
in
di
vi
du
al
s
in
th
e
da
ta
—
m
em
be
rs
of
th
e
To
p
10
0
—
w
ho
ar
e
in
cl
ud
ed
in
th
is
cl
ie
nt
ne
tw
or
k
of
Pu
tin
.
40
